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FAIR HOUSING MODIFICATIONS AND
ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE '90s
F. WILLIS CARUSO*
INTRODUCTION

The 1988 amendments to the 1968 Fair Housing Act extended the protections of the Act to discrimination because of handicap.' Prior to the amendments, the Fair Housing Act provided
effective relief to individuals denied housing because of race, color,
religion, national origin and sex. Such relief has included various
forms of injunctive relief, significant actual and punitive damages
and attorneys fees.2 One may commence action under the federal
act, in state or federal court, by filing an administrative complaint
with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). 3 Many state and local laws also prohibit discrimination
based on handicap or disability such as the provisions found in
the Illinois Human Rights Act.4
This Article will review the way the courts have used and
interpreted the Fair Housing Act's provisions prohibiting discrimination based on handicap. Additionally, this Article will consider
how the law may be implemented in the future. This analysis
recognizes that three categories of handicap-based discrimination
exist.

* Adjunct Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; Co-Executive
Director with Professor Michael P. Seng, The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Support Center; Director, The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing
Legal Clinic. Scott L. D'Angelo, a student at The John Marshall Law School, provided invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. The 1988 Amendments use the term "handicap" instead of the more often
used and accepted term "disabilities." It is clear that these terms are meant to be
interchangeable. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (1988).
2. The Court has broad powers of mandatory injunctive relief allowing it to: order execution of a specific lease, Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F.
Supp. 1146, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 1972); award substantial damages including economic,
emotional distress and punitive, Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685
F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir. 1982); and nullify zoning actions that have a racial impact
under certain circumstances, Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291 (7th Cir. 1977).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(1)(A)(i) (1988).
4. 775 ILCS 5/1-101 (1992). According to HUD staff, Illinois has lost its substantial equivalency status under the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(3)(A)
(1988). Complaints at HUD would be expected to remain with HUD and not be
referred to the Illinois Human Rights Department.
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The first category is what might be called "straight out" discrimination. For example, "I won't rent to you because of your
physical or mental disability." Although not as common as refusals to rent based upon race, in some instances landlords have
refused to rent or sell to individuals or tried to evict them because
of a handicap.5 Because these cases mimic race and national origin cases in many aspects, they will not be discussed here.
The second category is a refusal to provide a reasonable modification as specifically required by the Fair Housing Act 6 and as
explained in the Fair Housing Regulations. 7 Under most circumstances, a modification request is made to allow changes such as
adding grab bars to the bathroom. The landlord may not deny
such a request unless the circumstances support such a denial.'
In certain circumstances, the line between a modification and an
accommodation may be blurred.
The third category is the landlord's refusal of an individual's
request for a reasonable accommodation to enable him or her to
acquire or enjoy a unit. In some situations this could involve changing the general policies of an apartment complex regarding the
use of facilities, the dress code or even rules with regard to support animals. 9 Additionally, a reasonable accommodation request
can relate to zoning rules and procedures of a city or county as
applied to group homes for persons with mental or physical handicaps.' 0

5. For example, The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Clinic
defended a chancery case in state court involving a person with "Terrets Syndrome." The landlord's effort to force out the handicapped person and his family
succeeded because of the problems of living there during the suit. A federal damages case is pending.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A).
7. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203 (1989).
8. The regulations include two examples of reasonable modifications to which
the landlord must consent when the request is made by the handicapped tenant.
24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c)(1)-(2). The first example is the installation of grab bars in
the bathroom. Id. A landlord's requirement that the tenant remove the grab bars
when they vacate the premises is reasonable. Id. However, a requirement that
the tenant remove the inner wall reinforcements is unreasonable. Id. The second
example involves widening the bathroom doorway to make it wheelchair accessible.
Id.
9. See, e.g., Hodges v. Schmoeller, No. 94 C 4907 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 12, 1994).
Hodges involves one instance at the Law School Clinic in which the landlord would
allow cats but not dogs. Id. The compromise reached allowed support dogs that
weighed less than the average cat. Id. In another situation, the Condominium
board said the no pet policy prohibited "hearing cats" for the hearing impaired.
Heller v. 3950 N. Lake Shore Condominium Ass'n, No. 95 C 6528 (N.D. Ill. filed
Nov. 9, 1994). Assigning parking places out of order for a person with a disability
was the subject matter of another action.
10. For example, in United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 782
(W.D. Wis. 1991), the court found the Village's denial of an exception to the spac-
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I. THE IMPETUS FOR THE 1988 HANDICAP AMENDMENTS
In 1985, the Supreme Court handed down a negative decision
for group home advocates. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center," the Supreme Court held that the disabled are not a
suspect class.12 The City of Cleburne had refused to grant a special use permit to an organization to establish a group home for
mentally handicapped persons.13 The complaint alleged that a
rational basis did not exist for the belief that the proposed group
home for disabled persons posed a threat to the community.' 4 If
the acts of the municipality were subject to strict scrutiny, the
proponents of the home would prevail.' 5 However, by its ruling,
the Supreme Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to discrimination against disabled people.16 Advocates for the disabled believed the Cleburne case was a signal that the disabled would
have to turn their efforts to legislative remedies. As a result,
there was a concerted effort to pass the fair housing amendments
geared towards protecting the disabled. 7
The Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) provides broad
protections for persons with disabilities.'" The FHAA prohibits
discrimination against persons with handicaps in all areas of
housing, public and private. 9 For example, it encompasses discrimination in the sale, rental, financing, brokering, appraising,
making and purchasing of loans for dwellings 20 and local landuse decisions.2 ' The intent of Congress is clear from the House
Report:

ing requirements of the zoning ordinance to constitute a failure to make a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 788; see also Judy B. v. Borough of Tioga, 889 F. Supp.
792, 796 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (reversing the borough's decision to deny a variance to a
residential treatment facility); North Shore-Chicago Rehabilitation Inc., v. Village
of Skokie, 827 F. Supp. 497, 506 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (invalidating a village ordinance
requiring permanent occupancy in group homes due to its discriminatory effect on
handicapped persons).
11. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
12. Id. at 446.
13. Id. at 447-48.
14. Id. at 448.
15. Strict scrutiny is the test applied by the Supreme Court in cases of discrimination involving a suspect class such as race or national origin. See, e.g., Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
16. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
17. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 3601(f)(1)-(3).
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
21. See Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 19
(1988) (stating that municipal zoning ordinances and land use decisions are subject
to the Fair Housing Act's 'reasonable accommodation" requirement).
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The Fair Housing Amendments Act, like Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with

handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use of
stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about
disabilities and unfounded speculations about threats to safety are
specifically rejected as grounds to justify exclusion.22
The FHAA protects handicapped persons by broadly defining
the term "handicapped."2 3 The FHAA adopted the definition of
"handicapped" from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,24 in which
handicapped is defined as "any person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities; has a record of such impairment; or is regarded as having such an impairment." 2' The regulations list "mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities" as examples of handicaps.2 6 This
list is by no means exclusive. The Supreme Court held in School
Board of Nassau Co. v. Arline27 that persons with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) are considered "individuals with handi-

22. FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT COMMITTEE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 711,

100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3355 (1988).
23. The regulations divide physical and mental impairment into two areas. The
first includes:
Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: Neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic
skin; and endocrine.
24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(1) (1988). The second area is any mental or psychological
disorder, including but not limited to:
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities ... orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing
impairments, cerebral palsy, autism, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple
sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, Human Immunodeficiency Virus
infection, mental retardation, emotional illness, drug addiction (other than
addiction caused by current, illegal use of a controlled substance) and alcoholism.
24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2). See Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Housing DiscriminationAgainst People with
Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925, 943 (1994) (discussing the broad scope
of the FHAA in the context of mental and physical handicaps).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). Section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals with handicaps in programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance as well as federally conducted programs and activities. Id.
25. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 100.200.
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition
of "handicap."
27. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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caps."28
The FHAA also expands protection for handicapped individuals by the nature of transactions it covers. For example, the handicapped person who experiences discrimination can sue as well as
any person associated with the handicapped individual. 29 This
provision provides for a greater number of persons having standing to sue under the FHAA, which in turn results in a greater enforcement of its provisions.
II.

REASONABLE MODIFICATIONS

The FHAA provides that handicapped individuals shall be allowed to make reasonable modifications necessary to allow them
full enjoyment of a unit.3" This means that the landlord or other
housing provider is required to permit a tenant, at the tenants
expense, to make reasonable modifications to the premises (which
includes more than just the unit) if necessary in order to have full
use and enjoyment of the unit.31 The regulations give guidance
in this regard:
For example, if a laundry room is inaccessible, the only option open
to the tenant is to pay for physical modifications necessary to make
the room accessible. On the other hand, if the tenant chooses to ask
a friend to do his or her laundry in the laundry room, the landlord
must accommodate this situation by waiving any rule that prohibits
non-tenants from gaining access to the laundry room.3 2

Unlike reasonable accommodation issues which deal with a
range of actions relating to housing, the issue of reasonable modification usually arises when some type of landlord/tenant relationship already exists.33 Furthermore, in most situations reasonable

28. Id. at 284.
29. The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination against an individual in "the
sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer
or renter because of a handicap of ... any person associated with that buyer or
renter." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(C). This suggests a non-handicapped person who is
discriminated against because he or she is associated with a handicapped individual has a cause of action under § 3604(f)(1)(C). 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a)(3).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A).
31. Id.; 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a). Premises is defined in the regulations to include
"the interior or exterior parts, components or elements of a building or dwelling
unit, including the public and common areas of the building." 24 C.F.R. § 100,
commentary at 3247.
32. 24 C.F.R. § 100, commentary at 3247.
33. The comments to the regulations use the phrase "itis illegal to refuse to
permit a tenant with disabilities to make reasonable modifications." Id. (emphasis
added). However, when discussing the reasonable accommodations provisions of
the Act, the comments to the regulations use the phrase "personwith handicaps."
Id. at 3249 (emphasis added). See Kanter, supra note 23, at 957 (stating
"rr]easonable modification" differs from "reasonable accommodation" in that it is
.accomplished by the prospective ... tenant ... rather than by a current owner").
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modifications are done at the handicapped individual's expense34
merely requiring consent from the landlord, 3 rather than some
affirmative action as in reasonable accommodation situations.
Reasonable modifications usually relate to specific needs of an
individual based on his or her handicap. For example, a person
confined to a wheelchair may need to have the bathroom door
widened or have kitchen cabinets moved or lowered.36
The handicapped individual can make modifications such as:
installing ramps,3 7 grab bars,38 exercise equipment,3 9
alarms,4 ° audible and visual call mechanisms,4 ' widening
doors,42 lowering cabinets4 3 and providing assistance for the
hearing impaired. Such modifications are not limited to the apartment itself and can include changes in the garage, the outside
entrance to the building and common areas such as halls, the
laundry room and recreational areas."4 When such changes affect
more than one person and/or the public at large, the change may,
in fact, be an accommodation. The rules are fairly fact driven and
require reasonable actions by the landlord.
The tenant is required to seek the landlord's or provider's
consent to the modification in advance.45 In most cases the landlords will likely consent and may even finance the modifications.
However, the landlord may only deny the request for modification
if he or she can show that the proposed modification is unreasonable because it imposes an undue financial or administrative
burden on the landlord.46 Although proving undue financial or

34. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(a); 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(a).
35. 24 C.F.R, § 100.203(a).
36. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c)(1).

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(a).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c)(2).
43. Id.
44. See comments to § 100.203 for a discussion of the definition of premises as
including the common areas of a building as well as the individual dwellings. 24
C.F.R. § 100.203. The Comments explain that premises is defined in this manner
because that was the intention of Congress when the word was included in the
statute. Id.
45. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203.
46. See United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29
F.3d 1413, 1421 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing how the undue burden test used in ac-

commodation cases under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies to reasonable modification requests and the landlord must prove some "undue burden" to
prevent the tenant from making the modification); see also United States v. Freer,
864 F. Supp. 324, 326 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that a modification request is to be
considered unreasonable when it imposes an undue financial or administrative
burden on the landlord).
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administrative burden justifying denial is difficult for the landlord, he or she may set reasonable conditions on the modifications
to ensure the modifications are properly made and arrangements
are made for restoration.4 v For example, a landlord may require
a tenant to deposit the cost to restore the premises to its original
condition at the end of the lease term.48 However, the issue of
restoration is also a question of fact which depends upon the type
of modification made by the tenant. According to the regulations,
if the modification would not interfere with the landlord's or the
next tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises, then the tenant
is not required to restore the premises.49 One example of this is
the widening of doors to make them wheelchair accessible.5"
If the landlord refuses to consent to the modification the
tenant may have a cause of action. Furthermore, the tenant may
also have a cause of action if he believes the landlord unreasonably withheld consent for a modification."
Unlike actions under reasonable accommodation, not many
cases are brought solely on the issue of reasonable modification.
This is likely due to the fact that the modifications usually do not
financially burden the landlord or other housing provider. However, a few cases exist where a landlord has flat out refused to consent to the modification. In one such case, United States v. Freer," the owner of a trailer park refused to allow a handicapped
resident to construct a wheelchair ramp to the door of her trailer.
The trailer park owner asserted that the ramp would impede
trailer removal and would indirectly obstruct the trailer park's
access road and, therefore, would not allow it.53 The court stated
that the owner's refusal to permit installation of the ramp denied
47. The regulations state:
[t]he landlord may, where it is reasonable to do so, condition permission for
a modification on the renter agreeing to restore the interior of the premises
to the condition that existed before the modification,[the landlord may also] ... where it is necessary in order to ensure with reasonable certainty
that funds will be available to pay for the restorations at the end of the tenancy, the landlord may negotiate as part of such a restoration agreement a
provision requiring that the tenant pay into an interest bearing escrow account, over a reasonable period, a reasonable amount of money not to exceed
the cost of the restorations ... [the landlord may also] condition permission
for a modification on the renter providing a reasonable description of the
proposed modifications as well as reasonable assurances that the work will
be done in a workmanlike manner and that any required building permits
will be obtained.
24 C.F.R. § 100.203(a)-(b).
48. United States v. Freer, 864 F. Supp. 324 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
49. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c)(1).
50. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c)(2).
51. Kanter, supra note 24, at 957.
52. 864 F. Supp. 324 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
53. Id. at 326.
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the plaintiff equal opportunity to use and enjoy her home. 4 The
court then proceeded to find that the owner failed to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by demonstrating that the
plaintiffs proposed modifications imposed an undue financial or
administrative burden.55 The court then issued an injunction
permitting the plaintiff to install her wheelchair ramp. 6
A similar more recent case involves the owner of a condominium. In United States v. Country Club Garden Owners Ass'n,
the owner of the condominium suffered from osteoarthritis which
severely restricted her ability to walk without assistance. For this
reason, she requested permission to use a handicapped parking
space immediately behind her unit. 8 She also requested permission to modify the terrace behind the unit at the owner's expense
so that a gate and steps could provide her immediate access to the
parking space.59 The co-op association refused to allow the plaintiff to make the requested modifications.6 0
An important note in the context of reasonable modifications
is that the FHAA also included provisions for the handicap accessible design of covered multifamily dwellings. 1 This provision
applies to structures which had first occupancy a year and a half
after the enactment of the FHAA in 1991.2 The FHAA requires
full handicap accessibility of the common areas of such structures
and specifically that the main entrance is accessible and that all

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 159 F.R.D. 400 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
58. Id. at 401.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C). According to the regulations "covered multi-family
dwelling" are defined as "buildings consisting of four or more dwelling units if such
buildings have one or more elevators; and ground floor dwelling units in other
buildings consisting of four or more dwelling units." 24 C.F.R. § 100.201.
62. The exact cut-off date for first occupancy is March 13, 1991. 24 C.F.R. §
100.205(a). There is an exception if the building permit was issued on or before
January 30, 1990 and building is completed. Accessibility Preamble Guidelines, 24
C.F.R. § 100.305. The regulations also state that the newly constructed covered
multi-family dwellings must be handicap accessible unless "it is impractical to do
so because of the terrain or unusual characteristics of the site." Id. The burden of
proving impracticability is on the person who "designed or constructed the facility."
Id. The regulations go on to provide an example of when compliance with § 3604
(f)(3)(C) would be impractical:
A real estate developer plans to construct six covered multifamily dwelling
units on a site with a hilly terrain. Because of the terrain, it will be necessary to climb a long and steep stairway in order to enter the dwellings.
Since there is no practical way to provide an accessible route to any of the
dwellings, one need not be provided.
24 C.F.R. § 100.205(b).
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entrances are wheelchair accessible.63 With respect to individual
units, the FHAA requires accessibility to all switches and environmental controls, 4 reinforcement of bathroom walls as to allow
for any future installation of grab bars 65 and sufficient widths in

kitchens and bathrooms to allow for wheelchair maneuverability.6 6 The FHAA states that a building's compliance with the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards for
buildings and facilities providing accessibility and usability for
physically handicapped people (ANSI A117.1) satisfies the requirements set out in the FHAA.67
The ANSI standards provide specific architectural guidelines
that developers should follow to assure any newly constructed
multi-unit dwellings are fully handicap accessible.6 ' The standards are highly detailed and technical and an in depth discussion
of its provisions is outside the scope of this article.69 However,
the significance of these provisions and their relation to reasonable modification requirements is important to note. If a multifamily dwelling constructed after the FHAA took affect does not
conform to these requirements, the owner or developer may be
subject to an action for failure to design properly.7 °
Although not cited as often as reasonable accommodations,
the reasonable modifications requirement of the FHAA is just as
important. As previously mentioned, the small amount of litigation over modifications is probably due to the negligible burden
placed on the landlord. Furthermore, the requirements placed on
multifamily dwellings constructed after the amendment to the
FHAA will likely remove the need for later modifications if such
provisions are followed. 7 '
However, for structures existing before the FHAA, one should
always keep the modifications provision in mind when handicapped individuals are faced with the need to make changes to
their living unit to allow full enjoyment of it. Before an agreement
is reached with respect to a needed change, the parties should

63. 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(c)(2).
64. 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(c)(3)(ii).
65. 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(c)(3)(iii).
66. 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(c)(3)(iv).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(4); 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(e).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(4).
69. For further information, contact your applicable state agency regarding design management to determine whether the particular state follows the ANSI
standards or has its own standards.
70. The John Marshall Fair Housing Clinic is currently handling a case in federal court. One count of the plaintiffs complaint is against the developer of the
building in which she lives. The complaint alleges failure to design properly and
comply with the Fair Housing Act.
71. 24 C.F.R. § 100.305.
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address the question of whether the change is a modification or,
in fact, an accommodation.
III.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

A. Individual and Tenant Accommodations

The FHAA requires a landlord or other housing provider to
make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or
services when such accommodations are necessary for the handicapped individual to enjoy the unit.72 Unlike reasonable modifications, a request for a reasonable accommodation may require
the landlord or housing provider to take affirmative steps to ensure that the handicapped individual has an equal opportunity to
use and enjoy their dwelling.73 Reasonable accommodation can
encompass a myriad of actions or non-actions on the part of the
landlord or housing provider. 74 The type and extent of the modification depends on the particular needs of the handicapped individual. However, since the enactment of the provision, a clear set
of recurrent situations involving reasonable accommodations has
arisen. 75 A brief discussion of reasonableness under the FHAA
and the Regulations is necessary before proceeding.
The Regulations note that "It]he concept of 'reasonable
accommodation' is also used in regulations and case law interpreting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. "76 This suggests that
interpretation and case law surrounding § 504 applies to the parameters of reasonable accommodation under the FHAA. The key
case incorporated into the § 504 regulations is Southeastern Community College v. Davis.7 7 In that case, a nursing school denied

admission to a deaf applicant because she was hearing impaired. 78 The court held that the requested changes in the nurs-

ing training program to accommodate the hearing impaired applicant were too expensive and burdensome for an educational insti-

72. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a).
73. The examples of reasonable accommodations given in the regulations illustrate a landlord or housing provider taking steps to modify rules and procedures to
allow the handicapped individual to use and enjoy their dwelling. 24 C.F.R. §
100.204(b)(1)-(2); see also Richard B. Simring, The Impact of Federal
AntidiscriminationLaw on Housing for People With Mental Disabilities, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 413, 428 (1991) (discussing the landlord's duty to take "affirmative
steps" to accommodate the handicapped individual).
74. The reasonable accommodation requested by the handicapped individual
could involve any rule, policy or practice which interferes with his or her enjoyment of the dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
75. See infra notes 80-99 for a discussion of reasonable accommodation.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(4).
77. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
78. Id. at 399.
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tution to make."9 However, the Court did note that in certain
circumstances failure to accommodate may rise to the level of "unreasonable and discriminatory."' °
Reasonable accommodation most often requires a change in
rules, policy, practice and/or provision of services when necessary
to afford equal opportunity to the use and enjoyment of housing.s" More recent cases brought under the Fair Housing Act give
guidance regarding what is a reasonable accommodation in housing. In the context of accommodations in rules and policies, several major areas generate the most litigation.
The first major area involves the use of support animals. An
example of a reasonable accommodation is a landlord allowing a
blind man to have a support animal in spite of the building's no
pet policy. 2 However, landlords are not always willing to grant
exceptions for support animals. In Hall v. Becoviv, s3 the building
had a no pet policy and the landlord refused to grant an exception
to a blind tenant with a support animal.8 4 The hearing officer
held that the refusal was unlawful and in violation of the Chicago
Human Rights Ordinance. 5 Similarly, Bronk v. Ineichen s6 dealt
with a no-pet policy. However in this instance the support animal
was a "hearing dog" for two hearing impaired tenants.8 7 Although the plaintiffs lost because they failed to show that the dog
was properly trained as a hearing dog, the court addressed the
issue of reasonable accommodation. 8 The court stated "a deaf
individual's need for the accommodation afforded by a hearing dog

79. Id. at 402.
80. Id. Courts use this language when deciding whether a particular accommodation is reasonable. See infra notes 82-101 for a discussion of how courts use this
language.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
82. The example as given in the regulations is:
A blind applicant for rental housing wants to live in a dwelling unit with a
seeing eye dog. The building has a "no pets" policy. It is a violation of §
100.204 for the owner or manager of the apartment complex to refuse to
permit the applicant to live in the apartment with a seeing eye dog because,
without the seeing eye dog, the blind person will not have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.
24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b)(1).
83. Chicago Commission on Human Relations, No. 94 H 39 (1995). The John
Marshall Fair Housing Legal Clinic handled the case.
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995). At trial the defense brought in an expert on
hearing dogs who testified that two factors distinguish a hearing dog from a normal dog: intensive professional schooling and isolation from other animals. Id. at
428. The defense also illustrated that the plaintiffs lived at other residences without the assistance of a hearing dog. Id.
87. Id. at 427.
88. Id. at 429.
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is, we
think, per se reasonable within the meaning of the statute. " "9
The second major area of cases involves reasonable accommodations in miscellaneous other building policies and rules. This
line of cases involves various building policies which impede the
handicapped individual's use or enjoyment of the building as a
whole, as well as their respective unit. One subset of this area is
rules and regulations involving parking spaces. This situation is
covered in the Regulations which state that providing a parking
space close to the dwelling to someone who has a mobility related
handicap is a reasonable accommodation." Similar to this example, a first-come/first-served policy for awarding indoor parking
spaces was at issue in Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc.91 In
Shapiro, a tenant with multiple sclerosis asked for a reasonable
accommodation in the policy so that she might have an indoor
parking space.92 The court not only found that a change in the
parking policy would be a reasonable accommodation, it fully
included the regulation example in the opinion. 93 The court also
went on to say that it was a reasonable accommodation regardless
of whether enough parking spaces were available for all residents
of the complex. 94
In United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co.," a policy requiring fees for long term guests and long
term guest parking was at issue.9" The plaintiffs daughter suffered from a respiratory disease which required her to have a
home health care aide.97 The defendant management company
demanded guest fee payment for the presence of the home care
aide.9" The court stated that facially neutral policies and rules
which may "require landlords to assume reasonable financial bur-

89. Id.
90. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b)(2).

91. 844 F. Supp. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). See HUD v. Dedham Hous. Auth., Fair
Housing - Fair Lending Rep. (BNA) 9 25,023 (1992) (describing a parking policy
very similar to that in Shapiro).
92. CaliforniaMobile, 844 F. Supp. at 118. The plaintiff was only able to walk
by herself for short distances on level ground. Id. She was also subject to periodic
episodes in which she would experience total paralysis, like most people who suffer
from multiple sclerosis. Id. All of this information was conveyed to the building
owners and management company and they still refused to give her the parking
spot. Id.
93. Id. at 125.
94. Id.
95. 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir. 1994).
96. According to the court's factual summary the owner of the complex had a
policy of charging residents a fee of $1.50 per day for the presence of long-term
guests and $25.00 per month for guest parking. Id. at 1416.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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dens in accommodating handicapped residents" are nonetheless
reasonable accommodations that the landlord must make. 99
The courts utilize a type of balancing test when dealing with
reasonable accommodation cases. The courts appear to use this
approach regardless of the type of rule, policy or practice involved.
In such cases the courts will ask "[whether the accommodation
being requested will] not impose an undue hardship or burden
upon the entity making the accommodations and [will] not undermine the basic purpose which the requirement at issue seeks to
achieve."0 0 The courts have expanded on this test by stating
that '[a]lthough the defendant should not be required to assume
'undue financial burdens' that does not mean that a defendant
cannot be required to incur reasonable costs."10' In the context
of § 504, the courts have even gone as far as to state that a landlord or housing provider has an "affirmative obligation" to provide
a requested accommodation when doing so would not "impose such
undue burdens."' 2
In the context of reasonable accommodations in the rules,
policies and practices of landlords or housing providers, the two
key concepts are the specific needs of the individual making the
request and the burden such a request imposes on the landlord.'0 3 Based on the foregoing case law, the courts seem to tip
the scales in favor of the handicapped residents except in the most
extreme circumstances, most often citing to Congress' intent to
have the provisions of the Fair Housing Act broadly construed.'" Therefore, handicapped residents possess a powerful
tool in the reasonable accommodation provision of the Act when
dealing with an inflexible landlord or other housing provider. The
reasonable accommodations provision can insure that landlords
provide handicapped residents with the services or concessions

99. Id. at 1418. In reversing and remanding, the Court was quick to note "[tihe
reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination." Id. The Court suggested in dealing with a case such as this:
[A] reviewing court should examine, among other things, the amount of fees
imposed, the relationship between the amount of fees and the overall housing cost, the proportion of other tenants paying such fees, the importance of
the fees to the landlord's overall revenues, and the importance of the fee
waiver to the handicapped tenant.

Id.
100. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 403 (1979).
101. United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d
1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994).
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases
where courts balanced the needs of handicapped individuals against the burdens
those needs imposed on landlords.
104. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of examples
of how courts tend to favor the needs of handicapped residents.
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they need to enjoy their unit to the same extent as non-handicapped residents.
B. Group Home Accommodations
The area of reasonable accommodations for group homes has
developed at a fast pace over the past five years.' 5 Congress
recognized that private restrictive covenants and discriminatory
local government ordinances, rules and regulations could have the
purpose and/or effect of excluding or restricting group home congregate living facilities and other similar facilities for the disabled." 6 Congress' intentions are clear:
[t]o bar local government from applying laws and regulations in a
discriminatory manner against "congregate living arrangements
among non-related persons with disabilities." The FHAA is "intended to prohibit the application of special requirements through
land-use regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or special use permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of disabled individuals
to live in the residence of their choice in the com10 7
munity."

In Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,0 8
the Supreme Court held that municipal zoning ordinances are
subject to the Fair Housing Act's reasonable accommodation requirement.0 9 The Court went on to state that:
A discriminatory rule, policy, practice or service is not defensible
simply because that is the manner in which such rule or practice
has traditionally been constituted. This section would require that
changes be made to such traditional rules or practices if necessary
to permit a person which handicaps an equal opportunity to use and
enjoy the dwelling."0
In the context of group homes, the courts have defined a reasonable accommodation as "changing some rule that is generally applicable so as to make its burden less onerous on the handicapped
individual.""'
In most cases, the municipal ordinance in question is a facially neutral zoning provision such as a restriction on multi-family
2
housing in a single-family zone or an occupancy requirement.1
105. This fast pace is mainly due to the Oxford House cases which are discussed
infra notes 125-38. ,
106. FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT COMMITrEE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 711,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3355 (1988).
107. Id.
108. 668 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 462
(D.N.J. 1992).
112. For examples of cases involving neutral zoning provisions, see Robinson v.
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More common cases occur where the municipality has enacted a
zoning provision which applies specifically to group homes such as
spacing requirements"' or special procedures which a group
home must complete before they can begin occupancy." 4 In the
former, the handicapped individual normally asks for a reasonable
accommodation from the facially neutral provision. An example of
such an accommodation is a special use permit or variance to
locate a group home in a zone where such a use is not normally
permitted. 1 5 In the latter, the litigation has concentrated both
on the issue of the validity of such restrictions under the Fair
Housing Act and reasonable accommodations relating to such
restrictions.
In cases involving zoning adjustment mechanisms such as
variances, amendments, building permits or use permits, the
courts have utilized a balancing test similar to that used in the
individual reasonable accommodation cases." 6 That is, the court
will ask if the accommodation imposes undue hardship upon the
municipality.17 Specifically, in the context of zoning decisions,
the courts will look to several variables when conducting the balancing test including: crime and safety concerns; adverse impacts
on the value of real estate; alternative solutions or sites for the
group home; and the financial burdens involved for both parties." 8 These factors are most often listed in municipal zoning
ordinances for determining whether municipalities should grant
variances or other zoning adjustment mechanisms."
City of Friendswood, 890 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Judy B. v. Borough of
Tioga, 889 F. Supp. 792 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Thorton v. City of Allegan, 863 F. Supp.
504 (W.D. Mich. 1993); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223
(E.D. Pa. 1993); Pulcinella v. Ridley Township, 822 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Pa. 1993);
Easter Seal Soc'y of N.J. v. Township of N. Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228 (D.N.J. 1992);
Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town of Fairfield, 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D.
Conn. 1992); United States v. Borough of Audubon, 787 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1991).
113. For examples of cases involving spacing requirements, see Larkin v. Michigan, 883 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Horizon House v. Township of Upper
Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp.
at 872.
114. One example is requiring that a group home obtain a conditional use permit
before operating the home. Association for the Advancement of the Mentally Handicapped v. City of Elizabeth, 876 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.N.J. 1994). Another example
is requiring residents of group homes to have 24 hour supervision. Bangerter v.
Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1494 (10th Cir. 1995).
115. See cases cited supra note 112.
116. See cases cited supra notes 113-14 and infra note 135.
117. North Shore-Chicago Rehabilitation Inc. v. Village of Skokie, 827 F. Supp.
497, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
118. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (striking
down an ordinance limiting the number of related persons in a single family
home). See also Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp.
1285 (D. Md. 1993).
119. See DAVID R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CON-
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In many cases involving group homes, tremendous community opposition to the location of the proposed group home exists. 2 ' Normally, the municipality conducts public hearings and
council meetings to determine whether the group home may be
established. In most instances, the community opposition is based
on unfounded fears of the unknown and stereotypes of the mentally and physically handicapped or recovering alcoholics or drug
abusers."' These fears are often loudly expressed in the public
hearings. 22 In such cases, the courts take these issues into consideration when determining whether the zoning or rule change
requested was wrongly denied. 21 Judges have held, for example,
that where the municipal governing body made its decision based
on the unfounded fears of the community, the decision is properly
4
overturnable 2
Many municipalities have added provisions to their zoning
ordinances which specifically apply to group homes. One example
is occupancy restrictions.' 25 Maximum occupancy restrictions
limit the number of residents in a particular dwelling. They usually relate to the number of rooms in a particular dwelling. The
Fair Housing Act contains an exemption for "restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling." 2 ' The courts have held that only those occupancy re-

TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 3 (1990) (discussing the general requirements set out
in most zoning ordinances for whether a municipality should grant a variance).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872, 878-89
(W.D. Wis. 1991) (describing the community opposition to a proposed group home
and how the court examined the opposition and held that such opposition was the
true reason for city's denial of the group home's variance).
121. In most cases the public hearings will contain discussion about security and
supervision of the members of the group homes. Id. In a case currently being handled by The John Marshall Fair Housing Legal Clinic, the group home attempted
to get a variance from the R-2 zone in which the proposed site is located. Tri-City
Community Mental Health Centers, Case No. 2:95 CV-199RL(1) (N.D. Ind. filed
Nov. 30, 1995). When word of the group home spread, a petition was circulated
describing the residents as being victims of sexual abuse. Id. Although this was
correct, the petition went on to state that these residents (who are teenage girls)
may be predisposed to sexually abusing children in the surrounding community.
Id. This petition circulated even after Tri-City presented evidence that these girls
posed no threat to the surrounding community. Id.
122. In Village of Marshall, the audience at the public hearing denying the group
home's variance petition clapped and cheered when the petition was voted down.
787 F. Supp. at 875.

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of occupancy requirements
in City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995). The Court made a
distinction between occupancy requirements based solely on numerical restrictions
and those based on a definition of family. Id. at 1781. The Court found the former
fitting under the exemption contained in the Fair Housing Act. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).
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strictions relating solely to the number of persons permitted to
reside in a dwelling will pass muster. 127 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that those occupancy restrictions which
attempt to define "family" and equate restrictions with that
defi128
nition do not fall under the Fair Housing Act exemption.
Spacing requirements are another example of restrictions on
group homes. Many municipalities now include such provisions in
their zoning ordinances. These sections require that any group
homes within the boundaries of the municipality be a certain
distance apart. 129 In Horizon House Development Services, Inc. v.
Township of Upper Southampton,130 the court found that a 1000
foot minimum spacing requirement was facially invalid under the
Fair Housing Act because the requirement, "creates an explicit
classification based on handicap with no rational basis or legitimate government interest." 13' However, this issue is not fully
resolved because the courts have also upheld similar spacing requirements as a legitimate zoning concerns.'3 2
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has reported that between December 1993, and September 1994, the United States
Department of Justice filed fourteen cases alleging discrimination
in zoning, building code, occupancy and/or land use laws.1 3 3 Of
the cases filed, twelve alleged discrimination based on disability
status. 134 The growth in litigation of group home cases is demonstrated more so by the large volume of "Oxford House" cases. 13 Oxford House facilities are self-run, self-supporting homes
for persons recovering from alcohol and/or drug addiction. 136 As
of 1993, 375 Oxford Houses existed throughout the United

127. Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 457
(D.N.J. 1992).
128. Id.
129. The statute in dispute in Village of Marshall required that group treatment
facilities be spaced 2500 feet apart. 787 F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
130. 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
131. Id. at 697.
132. In Village of Marshall,the court did not hold that the spacing requirement
itself was invalid. 787 F. Supp. at 879. The court did hold that in the factual situation presented (the new group home was to be located across a river from an existing group home and was just under the minimum spacing requirement), the municipality failed to make a reasonable accommodation for the group home. Id.
133. U.S. COMM'N ON CIv. RTS., THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988:
THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 205 (1994).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Oxford House v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo.
1994); Oxford House v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993);
Oxford House v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford
House v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House v.
Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1992).
136. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1664.
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States. 37 Oxford House, Inc. and other similar entities have asserted the rights of the disabled under the FHAA and
have litigat38
ed "group home" issues in a large number of cities.1
Group homes continue to be an increasingly popular method
of treatment and care for persons with physical and mental disabilities. At the same time, the amount of litigation arising from
these homes will increase proportionally as long as municipalities
fail to make zoning decisions in accordance with the Fair Housing
Act. Furthermore, subtle zoning provisions designed to exclude
group homes will also fail to pass muster unless the provision is a
maximum occupancy requirement based solely on numerical restrictions. The courts recognize the importance of group homes
and will continue to construe the FHAA broadly to afford its
protections to the handicapped residents of group homes.
CONCLUSION

Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
to ensure that handicapped members of society have an equal
opportunity to reside and enjoy their living environment in the
same manner as all members of society. The FHAA recognizes
that sometimes landlords and other housing providers have to
take affirmative steps to ensure that handicapped individuals
have an equal opportunity to enjoy their living environment. The
FHAA acknowledges that changes in long-standing rules and the
imposition of reasonable financial burdens are not unreasonable
means for providing equal opportunity housing for handicapped
individuals.
In a broader sense, the Fair Housing Act requires communities as well as individual landlords to recognize equal opportunities for handicapped members of group homes or handicapped
individual homeowners. Communities can no longer rely on unfounded fears and stereotypes about handicapped individuals as a
basis for excluding them from their respective communities in
much the same way communities cannot exclude because of race.
Therefore, municipalities as well as individuals can save a tremendous amount of time and cost by simply complying with the
provisions of the FHAA while at the same time assuring that
handicapped individuals have the opportunity to assimilate into
their respective communities.

137. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. at 1181.
138. See supra note 135 for a list of cases where Oxford Houses or similar entities have asserted the rights of the disabled under the FHAA.

